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Monitoring for Waste: Evidence from Medicare Audits

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  • Maggie Shi

Abstract

This article examines the trade-offs of monitoring for wasteful public spending. By penalizing unnecessary spending, monitoring improves the quality of public expenditure and incentivizes firms to invest in compliance technology. I study a large Medicare program that monitored for unnecessary health care spending and consider its effect on government savings, provider behavior, and patient health. Every dollar Medicare spent on monitoring generated $24–$29 in government savings. The majority of savings stem from the deterrence of future care, rather than reclaimed payments from prior care. I do not find evidence that the health of the marginal patient is harmed, indicating that monitoring primarily deters low-value care. Monitoring does increase provider administrative costs, but these costs are mostly incurred up-front and include investments in technology to assess the medical necessity of care.

Suggested Citation

  • Maggie Shi, 2024. "Monitoring for Waste: Evidence from Medicare Audits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 139(2), pages 993-1049.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:139:y:2024:i:2:p:993-1049.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/qje/qjad049
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    Cited by:

    1. Atul Gupta & Ambar La Forgia & Adam Sacarny, 2024. "Turbocharging Profits? Contract Gaming and Revenue Allocation in Healthcare," NBER Working Papers 32564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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