Do Unjust States Have the Standing to Blame? Three Reservations About Scepticism

If an offender was treated unjustly by her state in a way that curtailed her options or otherwise made it more likely she would commit her crime, does her state have the moral standing to blame her for that crime? Many theorists have expressed scepticism that the state does. I present three reservations about such scepticism. First, much of it appears to derive its intuitive appeal from problems with the content of state condemnation that can be solved by changing its content rather than its source. Second, adequate legal recognition of everyone’s fundamental moral rights arguably requires not merely the proscription of violations of those rights, but authoritative public condemnation of such violations, which only the state is capable of supplying. Finally, an unjust state would not do disadvantaged offenders any favours by holding its tongue—nor would such offenders help themselves by closing their ears to its criticism.