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Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints

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  • Waterson, Michael

Abstract

This paper surveys the field of vertical integration and vertical restraints, with particular reference to implications for competition policy. It outlines the existing legal framework, then discusses some particular U.K. examples involving vertical restraints. The theoretical discussion includes analyses of technological economies, transactions costs, contractual rights, monopoly effects, verticle restraints as externalities, interbrand versus intrabrand competition, the strategic effects of vertical separation, and agency issues. Some policy implications are drawn, amongst these being the points that vertical linkages can have strong anticompetitive effects, that there is little support for separate treatment of resale price maintenance, that policy should focus on economic effects rather than legal form, that the case for the block exemption of franchising in the EC is unclear and that the law has failed to take the implications of the vertical separation literature into account. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Waterson, Michael, 1993. "Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 9(2), pages 41-57, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:41-57
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    Cited by:

    1. Tommaso Valletti, 2000. "Switching Costs in Vertically Related Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(4), pages 395-409, December.
    2. Rodriguez Castelan,Carlos, 2015. "The poverty effects of market concentration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7515, The World Bank.
    3. Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2000. "Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 471-496, April.
    4. Davide Vannoni, 1999. "Empirical Studies of Vertical Integration: the Transaction Cost Orthodoxy," CERIS Working Paper 199903, CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY.
    5. repec:bla:jecsur:v:12:y:1998:i:4:p:333-59 is not listed on IDEAS

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