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Politicians, institutional incentives, and citizen welfare: evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India

Author

Listed:
  • Prasenjit Banerjee
  • Vegard Iversen
  • Sandip Mitra
  • Kunal Sen

Abstract

We examine how politicians and non-politicians in rural India respond to behavioural incentives. Using a modified dictator game, we vary treatments (and incentives) across the nature of interactions, the visibility of actions, and an upfront promise. Under anonymity, politicians and non-politicians behave selfishly: both become significantly more generous when interactions are personalized. However, while non-politicians respond to greater visibility more strongly than politicians, an upfront promise induces more pronounced politician responses. Whereas promise-breaking appears to be more costly for politicians, visibility, via social image concerns, appears to matter more for non-politicians. This mix of similarity and heterogeneity in response suggests that evidence about the behaviour of real-world politicians is more important for effective policy design than acknowledged so far.

Suggested Citation

  • Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Kunal Sen, 2025. "Politicians, institutional incentives, and citizen welfare: evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 333-352.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:77:y:2025:i:2:p:333-352.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpae028
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; politician behaviour; social preferences; promises; dictator game; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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