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Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount

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  • Edward J Cartwright
  • Zarak Mirza

Abstract

In some instances charities insist on donors giving more than a minimum amount. In other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J Cartwright & Zarak Mirza, 2021. "Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 295-316.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:73:y:2021:i:1:p:295-316.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpz063
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    Cited by:

    1. Diederich, Johannes & Epperson, Raphael & Goeschl, Timo, 2021. "How to Design the Ask? Funding Units vs. Giving Money," Working Papers 0698, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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