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Climate leadership by conditional commitments

Author

Listed:
  • Leif Helland
  • Jon Hovi
  • HÃ¥kon Sælen

Abstract

Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreement’s effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment—based on a mixed sequential-simultaneous public good game with one leader and three followers—that helps answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors influence the effectiveness of leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments. Measuring effectiveness in terms of followers’ and total contributions, we find that it may help if the conditional promise is credible and if its implementation influences followers’ welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we find a significant effect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group’s efforts. These findings have important implications concerning the future success of the Paris Agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Leif Helland & Jon Hovi & HÃ¥kon Sælen, 2018. "Climate leadership by conditional commitments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 417-442.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:70:y:2018:i:2:p:417-442.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpx045
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Janina Grabs, 2023. "A theory of credible cross‐temporal corporate commitments as goal‐based private sustainability governance," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(8), pages 5146-5160, December.
    2. Aklin, Michaël & Buntaine, Mark T & Mildenberger, Matto, 2023. "Conditionality and the Politics of Climate Change," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series qt3mb417zg, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
    3. Takaaki Abe & Yukihiko Funaki & Taro Shinoda, 2021. "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-20, August.
    4. Robert Gampfer, 2016. "Minilateralism or the UNFCCC? The Political Feasibility of Climate Clubs," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 16(3), pages 62-88, August.
    5. Carattini, Stefano & Fankhauser, Sam & Gao, Jianjian & Gennaioli, Caterina & Panzarasa, Pietro, 2023. "What does network analysis teach us about international environmental cooperation?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    6. Joshua W. Busby & Johannes Urpelainen, 2020. "Following the Leaders? How to Restore Progress in Global Climate Governance," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 20(4), pages 99-121, Autumn.
    7. Kreitmair, Ursula & Bower-Bir, Jacob, 2021. "Too different to solve climate change? Experimental evidence on the effects of production and benefit heterogeneity on collective action," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Matthew McGinty, 2020. "Leadership and Free-Riding: Decomposing and Explaining the Paradox of Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(2), pages 449-474, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • F64 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Environment
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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