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Academic productivity before and after tenure: the case of the ‘specialist’

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  • João Ricardo Faria
  • Peter McAdam

Abstract

Studies suggest research productivity falls after tenure. We have limited choice-theoretic understanding of why this should occur. We rationalize this as follows. Some scholars are assumed to be ‘specialists’: their research productivity consists of transforming dissertation chapters into publishable papers. We show how a department that hired such a scholar provides incentives to maximize research productivity. We show that his research productivity paths are characterized by a ‘bang-bang’ solution, that is, he works with either maximum or minimum effort. The department sets the scholar’s wages proportional to their impatience to spur productivity and only succeeds if he turns out to be more impatient than the department. We also examine career development after tenure is granted: there occurs a clear polarization in terms of academic reputation and promotion prospects between the Specialist and other staff. The article provides a novel perspective on academic productivity and the tenure system.

Suggested Citation

  • João Ricardo Faria & Peter McAdam, 2015. "Academic productivity before and after tenure: the case of the ‘specialist’," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 291-309.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:67:y:2015:i:2:p:291-309.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpv002
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    Cited by:

    1. Yushan Hu & Ben G. Li, 2021. "The production economics of economics production," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 228-255, February.
    2. David B. Johnson & Jonathan Rogers, 2023. "First You Get the Money, Then You Get the Power: The Effect of Cheating on Altruism," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-21, May.
    3. Timothy Perri, 2018. "Economics of evaluation (with special reference to promotion and tenure committees)," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-19, February.
    4. Franklin G. Mixon & Kamal P. Upadhyaya, 2024. "When forgiveness beats permission: Exploring the scholarly ethos of clinical faculty in economics," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 83(1), pages 75-91, January.
    5. João Ricardo Faria & Rajeev K. Goel, 2016. "Academic Publication Uncertainty and Publishing Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 6176, CESifo.
    6. Feichtinger, G. & Grass, D. & Kort, P.M., 2019. "Optimal scientific production over the life cycle," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    7. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, 2020. "The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 115-132, June.
    8. João Ricardo Faria & Peter F. Wanke & João J. Ferreira & Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Research and innovation in higher education: empirical evidence from research and patenting in Brazil," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 116(1), pages 487-504, July.
    9. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, 2021. "The Marginal Impact of a Publication on Citations, and Its Effect on Academic Pay," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(9), pages 8217-8226, September.

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