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An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation

Author

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  • Arthur J. Caplan
  • Richard C. Cornes
  • Emilson C. D. Silva

Abstract

We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuring trading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resource transfers and global participation, a scheme which we call 'Ideal Kyoto Protocol', yields an efficient equilibrium allocation for a global economy. An altruistic international agency--say, the Global Environment Facility--should operate the resource transfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments should be able to make independent policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipation of the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggests that the USA should be 'bribed' to reverse its decision of not participating in the Kyoto Protocol. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur J. Caplan & Richard C. Cornes & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2003. "An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 216-234, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:216-234
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2008. "A Lindahl Solution To International Emissions Trading," Working Paper 1177, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. Silva, Emilson C.D. & Zhu, Xie, 2009. "Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 169-182, September.
    3. Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2007. "An equitable, efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 263-279, June.
    4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, February.
    5. Silva, Emilson C.D. & Zhu, Xie, 2008. "On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: Type of externality and timing of policymaking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 213-216, August.
    6. Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2006. "Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Trade with Complete Specialization," Climate Change Modelling and Policy Working Papers 12060, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    7. Emilson C.D. Silva & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2018. "Overlapping Climate Clubs under Transaction Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 7319, CESifo.
    8. Gersbach, Hans & Winkler, Ralph, 2011. "International emission permit markets with refunding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 759-773, August.
    9. Robert Kohn, 2005. "A Theoretical Inefficiency in the International Marketing of Tradable Global Warming Emission Permits," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 23-31, January.
    10. Oladi, Reza & Caplan, Arthur J. & Gilbert, John, 2018. "Sequestration and the engagement of developing economies in a global carbon market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 50-63.
    11. Anil Markandya & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2012. "Impure public technologies and environmental policy," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(2), pages 128-143, May.
    12. Kristen A. Sheeran, 2006. "Side Payments of Exceptions: The Implications for Equitable and Efficient Climate Control," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 515-532, Summer.

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