IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v54y2002i2p247-269.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Time-consistent linear taxation and redistribution in an overlapping-generations framework

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Michel

Abstract

We study time-consistent labour and capital income linear taxation using an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of a small open economy. Individuals have different productivities and the government intervenes for purely redistributive purposes. The study of time-consistent taxation requires the introduction of borrowing restrictions in the economy. We characterize the time-consistent solution and consider alternative solutions based on a simple tax rule. We demonstrate the existence and the uniqueness of the time-consistent solution using a log-linear utility function. We provide numerical comparisons between time-consistent and time-inconsistent linear taxation: the importance of being able to make commitment decreases when the differences between individuals increase. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Michel, 2002. "Time-consistent linear taxation and redistribution in an overlapping-generations framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 247-269, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:54:y:2002:i:2:p:247-269
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:54:y:2002:i:2:p:247-269. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.