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Monetary Policy Games and Coalitions in a Two-Country Model with Unionised Wage Setting

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  • Zervoyianni, Athina

Abstract

The authors show that, in interdependent unionized economies, cooperation between wage-setters at home and abroad improves both their own positions and social welfare relative to universal Nash play. Moreover, a move from all-around Nash play to cooperation between home and foreign unions and between home and foreign policymakers may produce Pareto improvements or outcomes that are preferable to Nash play for the coalition as a whole. However, intranational coalitions may lack the support of unions. Such coalitions unambiguously improve the policymakers' position. However, in an interdependent world, they do not necessarily make the unions better-off relative to other regimes. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Zervoyianni, Athina, 1997. "Monetary Policy Games and Coalitions in a Two-Country Model with Unionised Wage Setting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 57-76, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:49:y:1997:i:1:p:57-76
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    Cited by:

    1. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
    2. Agiomirgianakis, George & Zervoyianni, Athina, 2001. "Macroeconomic equilibrium with illegal immigration," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-202, April.
    3. Agiomirgianakis, George & Zervoyianni, Athina, 2001. "Globalization of labor markets and macroeconomic equilibrium," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 109-133.
    4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Wage and Public Expenditure Setting in a Monetary Union," Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, vol. 6(1-2), pages 1-16, May - Nov.
    5. Borda, Patrie & Gaumont, Damien & Manioc, Olivier, 2011. "Unions’ Coordination and the Central Banker’s behavior in a Monetary Union," MPRA Paper 50293, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0106003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Robert Franzese, 2001. "Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 457-486, December.
    8. Akira Shimada, 2004. "Reducing the Inflow of Unskilled Foreign Workers," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 2(1), pages 85-96.

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