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Strategic Investment with Consistent Conjectures

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  • Dixon, Huw

Abstract

This pape r combines two ideas in oligopoly theory: models of strategic investment and T. Bresnehan's_(1981) concept of consistency of conjectures. Firms precommit capita l stocks and hencedetermine their short-run cost function. The degree of compet ition in the product market is made endogenous by imposing Bresnehan's consisten cy condition. Firms take into account the influence of their investment decision on the degree of competition in the productmarket. The equilibrium conjecture of firms will lie between the Cournot and Bertrand values. In general there will be factor bias and inefficiency in production, which in a symmetric equilibrium is one of undercapitalisation. The degree of competition is sensitive tothe wa ge-rental ratio: for high wage-rental ratios the equilibrium conjecture will be nearly Bertrand, and for low ratios they will be Cournot. Copyright 1986 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Dixon, Huw, 1986. "Strategic Investment with Consistent Conjectures," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(0), pages 111-128, Suppl. No.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:38:y:1986:i:0:p:111-28
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    Cited by:

    1. Paulo Brito & Bipasa Datta & Huw Dixon, 2011. "The evolution of mixed conjectures in the rent-extraction game," Discussion Papers 11/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Tay-Cheng Ma, 2005. "Strategic investment and excess capacity: A study of the Taiwanese flour industry," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 8, pages 153-170, May.
    3. Gangopadhyay Partha & Elkanj Nasser, 2009. "Politics of Defence Spending and Endogenous Inequality," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 27-49, May.
    4. Ma, Tay-Cheng, 2005. "Strategic Investment and Excess Capacity: A Study of the Taiwanese Flour Industry," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18, May.
    5. Somma, Ernesto, 1999. "The effect of incomplete information about future technological opportunities on pre-emption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 765-799, August.
    6. Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

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