Delivery-Contingent Contracts for Research
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Citations
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Cited by:
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2010.
"Procurement when price and quality matter,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 1-34, March.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Procurement When Price and Quality Matter," Working Papers 06-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2010. "Procurement when price and quality matter," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99378, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cantillon, Estelle & Asker, John, 2007. "Procurement when Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 6082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino & Iozzi, Alberto, 2017. "Public procurement with unverifiable quality: The case for discriminatory competitive procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 14-26.
- Bergmann, Rouven & Friedl, Gunther, 2008. "Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and asymmetric information," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 1504-1514, October.
- Koh, Youngwoo, 2017. "Incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 393-426.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012.
"Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ciccotello, Conrad S. & Hornyak, Martin J., 2000. "Cooperation via contract: An analysis of research and development agreements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013.
"Exit options and the allocation of authority,"
Discussion Papers
2013/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 401, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Miller, Nathan H., 2014. "Modeling the effects of mergers in procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 201-208.
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