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Campaign contributions, partisan politics, and environmental polarization in the US Congress

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Listed:
  • Dean Lueck
  • Julio A Ramos Pastrana
  • Gustavo Torrens

Abstract

Prior literature has shown strong and increasing polarization on environmental voting in the US Congress, with Democrats tending to support pro-environmental (“green”) legislation and Republicans opposing it. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we provide a causal estimate of the effect of partisanship on the importance of campaign contributions from brown industries received by US legislators. Electing a Republican rather than a Democrat for the House (Senate) leads to an increase of 96% (70%) in the importance of contributions from anti-environmental (“brown”) groups. We also find that greater dependence on brown groups is associated with less pro-environmental voting for legislators from both parties and the greater the importance of brown contributions the more (less) likely that a legislator breaks the party line when its party favors (opposes) pro-environmental legislation. Finally, we provide an analytical narrative of the rise and pattern of environmental polarization consistent with our empirical findings. (JEL D72, Q58)

Suggested Citation

  • Dean Lueck & Julio A Ramos Pastrana & Gustavo Torrens, 2025. "Campaign contributions, partisan politics, and environmental polarization in the US Congress," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 159-195.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:41:y:2025:i:1:p:159-195.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewad018
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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