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A Potentially Known Confidential Settlement

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  • Frances Xu Lee

Abstract

This article studies the incentive to settle confidentially, openly, or to go to trial given that the existence of a confidential settlement might become publicly known. Depending on whether the defendant (D) or the plaintiff cares more about the Public’s inference from the litigation outcome, a confidential settlement may signal a more-culpable or less-culpable D. The informational disadvantage of confidentiality is weighed against the benefit of privacy, as well as the litigants’ relative desire for more visibility or less visibility. (JEL K41, K13).

Suggested Citation

  • Frances Xu Lee, 2023. "A Potentially Known Confidential Settlement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 493-520.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:39:y:2023:i:2:p:493-520.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewab034
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics

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