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Voter Turnout and City Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities

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  • Anna Lo Prete
  • Federico Revelli

Abstract

Using data on mayoral elections in large Italian cities during the 2000s, we investigate whether and how voter turnout affects city performance across a number of dimensions. To address the issue of voter turnout endogeneity and identify the transmission mechanism, we exploit exogenous variation in participation rates in mayoral elections due to anticipated shocks (concurrence of local and national elections) and unanticipated shocks (bad weather on the day of the election) to the cost of voting. The results consistently point to a negative impact of voter turnout rates on indicators of urban environmental performance, life quality, and administrative efficiency. Interestingly, though, we find that only anticipated shocks to turnout affect the quality of elected mayors measured on a number of competence dimensions, compatibly with the hypothesis of a selection mechanism whereby parties choose candidates to maximize their chances of winning the elections based on their expectations on voter turnout rates (JEL D72, H72, C26).

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Lo Prete & Federico Revelli, 2021. "Voter Turnout and City Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 168-197.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:37:y:2021:i:1:p:168-197.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewaa012
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • C26 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation

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