IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jleorg/v29y2013i6p1344-1383.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Investor Protection and the Value of Shares: Evidence from Statutory Rules Governing Variations of Shareholders' Class Rights in an Emerging Market

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Muravyev

Abstract

This article uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of nonvoting shareholders to veto unfavorable changes to their class rights. We take advantage of the presence of well-defined treatment and control groups and use the voting premium, a traditional measure of private benefits of control and shareholder expropriation, as the outcome variable. Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual-class stock companies in Russia and using a difference-in-difference regression analysis as well as an event study, we find a statistically and economically significant effect of improved protection of preferred shareholders on the value of their shares. The result is robust to several changes in the empirical specification. (JEL G30, G38, K22) The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Muravyev, 2013. "Investor Protection and the Value of Shares: Evidence from Statutory Rules Governing Variations of Shareholders' Class Rights in an Emerging Market," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(6), pages 1344-1383, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:29:y:2013:i:6:p:1344-1383
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ews001
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ichiro Iwasaki & Satoshi Mizobata & Alexander Muravyev, 2018. "Ownership dynamics and firm performance in an emerging economy: a meta-analysis of the Russian literature," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 290-333, May.
    2. Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2014. "The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 247-261.
    3. R. Ferretti & P. Pattitoni & R. Patuelli, 2016. "Market Abuse Directive and Insider Trading: Evidence from Italian Tender Offers," Working Papers wp1071, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:29:y:2013:i:6:p:1344-1383. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.