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Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption?

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  • Samia Costa

Abstract

International organizations have encouraged countries to adopt Freedom of Information (FOI) laws as a means to increase transparency and thus combat corruption. This article uses the recent introduction of FOI laws in several countries as a natural experiment to determine their effect on corruption perceptions and the quality of governance. Using different corruption perception indices, both at the macro- and micro-level, I find that countries that adopted FOI laws saw an increase in perceived corruption and a decrease in the quality of governance, rather than the expected improvement. This increase in corruption perception seems to take place in the initial years of the reform, with no significant decrease in the long term. Countries with a free press appear to be the ones experiencing the increase. Results are robust throughout different samples and specifications. (JEL D72, D73, H11, K39, K42). The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Samia Costa, 2013. "Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(6), pages 1317-1343, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:29:y:2013:i:6:p:1317-1343
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ews016
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. You, Jing & Nie, Huihua, 2017. "Who determines Chinese firms' engagement in corruption: Themselves or neighbors?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 29-46.
    2. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    3. Nishijima, Marislei & Ellis, Randall P. & Cati, Regina C., 2022. "Primary healthcare effects of a well-designed anti-corruption program," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 25(C).
    4. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray, 2015. "Do transparency initiatives work? Assessing the impact of the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) on data transparency," CAMA Working Papers 2015-24, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Cordis, Adriana S. & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Sunshine as disinfectant: The effect of state Freedom of Information Act laws on public corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 18-36.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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