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Judicial Independence and Retention Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Brandice Canes-Wrone
  • Tom S. Clark
  • Jee-Kwang Park

Abstract

Judges face retention elections in over a third of US state courts of last resort and numerous lower courts. According to conventional wisdom, these elections engender judicial independence and decrease democratic accountability. We argue that in the context of modern judicial campaigns, retention elections create pressure for judges to cater to public opinion on "hot-button" issues that are salient to voters. Moreover, this pressure can be as great as that in contestable elections. We test these arguments by comparing decisions across systems with retention, partisan, and nonpartisan contestable elections. Employing models that account for judge- and state-specific effects, we analyze new data regarding abortion cases decided by state supreme courts between 1980 and 2006. The results provide strong evidence for the arguments. (JEL D72, K40) The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, 2012. "Judicial Independence and Retention Elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 211-234.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:28:y::i:2:p:211-234
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewq009
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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