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Breach Remedies, Performance Excuses, and Investment Incentives

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  • Urs Schweizer

Abstract

The present article investigates investment decisions generated by legal regimes that combine different breach remedies and performance excuses from contract law in a setting where investments are hidden actions and both costs and benefits from performance are of stochastic nature. The stochastically richer setting and the combination of remedies turns out to alter qualitatively some of the findings from the previous law and economics literature. Moreover, the analytical method propagated might also prove useful for applications beyond the topic of the present article. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

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  • Urs Schweizer, 2012. "Breach Remedies, Performance Excuses, and Investment Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 717-733, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:28:y:2012:i:4:p:717-733
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewq018
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel & Lars Freund, 2017. "Behaviorally Efficient Remedies – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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