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Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation

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  • William Pyle

Abstract

Political competition and "merchant group" pressures have been pointed to as forces that limit state threats to the property rights of firms. This article presents evidence confirming their importance and highlighting an interesting feature of their interaction. Drawing on separate surveys of managers at industrial enterprises and directors of business associations in the Russian Federation, we demonstrate that a firm's willingness to contest government predation, its ability to influence reforms to its institutional environment, and its propensity to invest in physical capital are positively related both to the membership in a business association and to the level of political competition in its region. Of particular note, the relationship between association membership and property rights strengthens in less politically competitive regions. Business community collective action, that is, appears to serve as a substitute for political competition in securing firms' property rights. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • William Pyle, 2011. "Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 2-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:27:y::i:1:p:2-31
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewp013
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Other publications TiSEM 99d2d002-87d2-4d8e-b1d9-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Andrei Yakovlev & Andrei Govorun, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 116, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    3. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
    4. Jens Prüfer, 2016. "Business Associations and Private Ordering," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 306-358.
    5. Andrei Govorun, 2013. "The choice of lobbying strategy: direct contacts with officials or mediation via business associations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 24/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Duvanova Dinissa & Sokhey Sarah Wilson, 2016. "Choosing which firms to help in crisis: evidence from the emerging European economies," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 225-262, October.
    7. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Other publications TiSEM bb36b0e2-f17f-4d76-8637-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. D. V. Shcherbakova & A. A. Medved, 2019. "Factors of Investment Attractiveness of Russian Regions," Administrative Consulting, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. North-West Institute of Management., issue 11.
    9. Baranov, Alexey & Malkov, Egor & Polishchuk, Leonid & Rochlitz, Michael & Syunyaev, Georgiy, 2015. "How (not) to measure Russian regional institutions," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 154-181.
    10. Larrain Aylwin, M.J. & Prüfer, J.O., 2014. "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions," Discussion Paper 2014-071, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Hayley H. Chouinard & Gregmar I. Galinato & Philip R. Wandschneider, 2016. "Making Friends To Influence Others: Entry And Contribution Decisions That Affect Social Capital In An Association," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 819-834, April.
    12. Duvanova, Dinissa, 2014. "Economic Regulations, Red Tape, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Communist Economies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 298-312.
    13. Govorun Andrei & Pyle William & Marques II Israel, 2016. "The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 395-433, December.
    14. Andrey Tkachenko & Daniil Esaulov, 2018. "The Role Of Governors In Public Procurement," HSE Working papers WP BRP 19/PSP/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 32/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    16. Stephen Weymouth & J. Lawrence Broz, 2013. "Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross-Country Firm-Level Evidence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 229-256, July.
    17. Chavis, Larry, 2013. "Social networks and bribery: The case of entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 279-293.

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