Product Recall and Liability

This article examines a firm's incentives to recall its product after learning that the product may harm consumers. It discusses whether courts should protect consumers who do not comply with recalls. Under the "no duty to return" rule, the firm bears the same liability no matter whether it has made a recall or not. The firm then may not recall the product as often as socially desired or provide insufficient reimbursement for consumers' return costs. In contrast, the "full duty to return" rule denies the firm's future liabilities after it makes a recall. More consumers then return the product, which may reduce the firm's incentives to recall the product. We show that the "full duty to return" rule may or may not generate more product recalls or higher social welfare. We also discuss the "partial duty to return" rule, which partially reduces the firm's liability after it makes a recall. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.