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Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process

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  • Stephen Nunez

Abstract

Both ideology and interest group interventions are important in voting on bankruptcy legislation. Roughly 15 votes in the U.S. House of Representatives appear to have been changed directly through interest group pressures proxied by campaign contributions. Many more could have been changed if resources could be fully devoted to spot purchases, but most contributions appear to have been aimed at maintaining legislation on the agenda. In the U.S. Senate, state interests in homestead exemptions influenced voting. Although committee markups demonstrate an ideological lineup that is not distinct from floor voting, committees promote bargaining on destabilizing issues. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Nunez, 2004. "Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 527-557, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:20:y:2004:i:2:p:527-557
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Theocharis N. Grigoriadis & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Energy Regulation, Roll Call Votes and Regional Resources: Evidence from Russia," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-25, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    2. Theocharis N. Grigoriadis & Benno Torgler, 2007. "Market Reform, Regional Energy and Popular Representation: Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 221, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
    3. Mian, Atif & Sufi, Amir & Trebbi, Francesco, 2013. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 373-408, October.
    4. Florian Buck, 2014. "Financial Regulation and the Grabbing Hand," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(04), pages 03-13, January.
    5. Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Behn, Markus & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113082, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:19105947 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Florian Buck, 2014. "Financial Regulation and the Grabbing Hand," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(4), pages 03-13, 01.
    8. Christopher Hare & Tzu-Ping Liu & Robert N. Lupton, 2018. "What Ordered Optimal Classification reveals about ideological structure, cleavages, and polarization in the American mass public," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 57-78, July.
    9. Frieden, Jeffry, 2015. "The political economy of adjustment and rebalancing," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 4-14.
    10. Bradley A. Hansen & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, 2005. "The Role of Path Dependence in the Development of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 1880-1938," Working Papers 2005-14, American University, Department of Economics.
    11. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    12. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 1-28, April.

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