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A Note on Multiple Equilibria and Punitive Damages Rules in "Everybody Out of the Pool."

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  • Daughety, Andrew F
  • Reinganum, Jennifer F

Abstract

This article describes two types of revealing equilibria in the presence of punitive damages meant to encourage truthful revelation of the safety of a product. Full information price (FIP) revealing equilibria occur when the equilibrium prices are those that would obtain under full information. Full information quantity (FIQ) revealing equilibria occur when the equilibrium quantities are those that would obtain under full information. We discuss the punitive damages policies which support each type of equilibrium and argue that FIP revealing equilibria are likely to be of greater interest. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1998. "A Note on Multiple Equilibria and Punitive Damages Rules in "Everybody Out of the Pool."," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 379-387, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:379-87
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