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Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
  • Lothar Ehring

Abstract

Globalization creates a demand for international rule-making, and the WTO remains the forum for creating binding and enforceable international trade rules. The WTO therefore needs an effective decision-making system capable of resolving diverging interests. Although the WTO Agreement foresees votes where consensus cannot be reached, the practice of consensus dominates the process of decision-making. The GATT 1947 only spoke of voting and did not mention the word 'consensus'. The WTO Agreement reflects the evolution from votes to consensus in the GATT 1947. Nevertheless, voting was not abandoned in the WTO Agreement. Although the consensus practice generally works well, it nevertheless implies the risk of deadlock and in particular the Membership's inability to respond legislatively where it disagrees with a panel's or the Appellate Body's legal interpretation. Consensus also inherently favours the status quo and can make it extremely difficult to achieve change. Consensus does not provide for equality (in terms of decision and influence) because not every Member has the same ability to maintain vetoes. Consensus of course has many advantages, but it is questionable whether it is also more democratic than the majority rule. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, 2005. "Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 51-75, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:8:y:2005:i:1:p:51-75
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Sommerer & Theresa Squatrito & Jonas Tallberg & Magnus Lundgren, 2022. "Decision-making in international organizations: institutional design and performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 815-845, October.
    2. Wilfredo Robayo Galvis, 2018. "La defensa internacional de los intereses del estado en América Latina. Temas de derecho internacional público n.° 1," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1076.
    3. Bowen, T. Renee & Broz, James, 2020. "Designing an International Economic Order: A Research Agenda," CEPR Discussion Papers 15407, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Josep M. Colomer, 2016. "Is democracy compatible with global institutions?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 260-272, September.
    5. Miettinen, Topi & Vanberg, Christoph, 2020. "Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining," Working Papers 0679, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    6. Michael Reiterer, 2009. "The Doha development agenda of the WTO," Progress in Development Studies, , vol. 9(4), pages 359-375, October.
    7. Sommerer, Thomas & Squatrito, Theresa & Tallberg, Jonas & Lundgren, Magnus, 2021. "Decision-making in international organizations: institutional design and performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111834, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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