IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jieclw/v27y2024i1p114-129..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Whither security? The concept of ‘essential security interests’ in investment treaties’ security exceptions

Author

Listed:
  • Caroline Henckels

Abstract

Unlike the WTO agreements, most investment treaties’ security exceptions do not further define the concept of ‘essential security interests’, creating significant uncertainty. Securitization theory illuminates conceptual problems associated with an expansive approach to security, security’s role in justifying extraordinary deontic powers, and securitization’s contingency on intersubjective agreement. As securitizing actors, states have put forward four paradigms of security, each significantly expanding the concept beyond its traditional contours. Investors have resisted with two counter-securitizing moves, each involving several tactics. Reacting to these moves and countermoves, tribunals have functioned as either empowering audiences or as nullifying audiences. The ambiguity of essentiality has also generated incongruent interpretations. States’, investors’, and tribunals’ approaches operate on three different planes, each with potential to significantly constrain security’s scope or even negate a successful securitization. Expansive and restrictive interpretations of security present competing implications that make defining it an invidious task, but some interpretations of essentiality are more tenable than others. Overall, tribunals’ narrow interpretations of the concept have operated to considerably limit states’ securitization attempts. While investors should keep a close eye on pending cases involving potentially self-judging security exceptions, they need not be overly concerned that security exceptions pose a significant threat to their interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Caroline Henckels, 2024. "Whither security? The concept of ‘essential security interests’ in investment treaties’ security exceptions," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 114-129.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:27:y:2024:i:1:p:114-129.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jiel/jgae011
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:27:y:2024:i:1:p:114-129.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jiel .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.