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Ostracism and Common Pool Resource Management in a Developing Country: Young Fishers in the Laboratory

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  • Wisdom Akpalu
  • Peter Martinsson

Abstract

This paper investigates how the possibility to ostracise, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to subjects in the experiment, affects harvest in a common pool resource experiment. The experiment was framed as a fishing problem and the subjects were young fishers in Ghana. We find that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise other members of a group at a cost to the remaining members of the group decreased over-fishing significantly in comparison with a situation where ostracism was not possible. The ostracism was based on at least 50% voting rule. Moreover, the subjects demonstrated a strong desire to ostracise those who over-fished. Copyright 2012 , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Wisdom Akpalu & Peter Martinsson, 2012. "Ostracism and Common Pool Resource Management in a Developing Country: Young Fishers in the Laboratory," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 21(2), pages 266-306, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:266-306
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jae/ejr034
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    Cited by:

    1. Wisdom Akpalu & Edwin Muchapondwa & Babatunde Adidoye & Witness Simbanegavi, 2015. "Public disclosure for pollution abatement: African decision-makers in a PROPER public good experiment," WIDER Working Paper Series 060, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Anne-Sophie Crépin & Caroline Schill & Edwin Muchapondwa & Herbert Ntuli, 2019. "Sanctioned quotas vs information provisioning for community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe: A framed field experiment approach," Working Papers 772, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    3. Astrid Dannenberg & Corina Haita-Falah & Sonja Zitzelsberger, 2020. "Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 84-109, March.
    4. Alexandra Baier & Loukas Balafoutas & Tarek Jaber-Lopez, 2023. "Ostracism and theft in heterogeneous groups," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 193-222, March.
    5. Wisdom Akpalu & Babatunde Abidoye & Edwin Muchapondwa & Witness Simbanegavi, 2015. "Public disclosure for pollution abatement: African decision-makers in a PROPER public good experiment," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2015-060, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Herbert Ntuli & Anne-Sophie Crépin & Caroline Schill & Edwin Muchapondwa, 2023. "Sanctioned Quotas Versus Information Provisioning for Community Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe: A Framed Field Experiment Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(3), pages 775-823, March.

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