IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/indcch/v6y1997i4p741-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interconnection Pricing, Stranded Costs, and the Optimal Regulatory Contract

Author

Listed:
  • Wildman, Steven S

Abstract

Given the potential for strategic gaming inherent in network providers' reliance on their competitors for the supply of vital inputs, interconnection pricing or the setting of prices at which networks sell access to their facilities and their customers to other networks has become a critical issue in the design of policies to promote competition in telecommunications markets. Debate has focused on the prices entrants should pay for access to the facilities and customers on the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) who until recently were protected monopolies. A critical question is the size of the contributions competitors should make to incumbents' fixed costs and regulatory burdens in the prices they pay for network elements and services purchased from ILECs. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Wildman, Steven S, 1997. "Interconnection Pricing, Stranded Costs, and the Optimal Regulatory Contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 6(4), pages 741-755, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:6:y:1997:i:4:p:741-55
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Levine, Paul & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2002. "Market Entry and Roll-out With Product Differentiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3237, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Sappington, David E.M., 2006. "On the design of input prices: Can TELRIC prices ever be optimal?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 197-215, June.
    3. Berry, S. Keith, 2002. "Generation search costs and Ramsey pricing in a partially deregulated electric utility industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 331-343.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:6:y:1997:i:4:p:741-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/icc .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.