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Bondholders versus bond-sellers? Investment banks and conditionality lending in the London market for foreign government debt, 1815-1913

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Abstract

This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in nineteenth-century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support countries facing liquidity crises in a manner similar to modern descriptions of 'relationship' lending to corporate clients by 'parent' banks. Prestigious bankers' ability to implement conditionality loans and monitor countries' financial policies also enabled them to deal with solvency. We find that, compared with prestigious bankers, bondholders' committees had neither the tools nor the prestige required for effectively dealing with defaulters. Hence such committees were far less important than previous research has claimed. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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  • Marc Flandreau & Juan H. Flores, 2012. "Bondholders versus bond-sellers? Investment banks and conditionality lending in the London market for foreign government debt, 1815-1913," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 16(4), pages 356-383, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ereveh:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:356-383
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ereh/hes005
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    Cited by:

    1. Catão, Luis A.V. & Mano, Rui C., 2017. "Default premium," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 91-110.
    2. Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, 2014. "Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early 20th Century United States," NBER Working Papers 20544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ecchia, Stefania, 2016. "La controversia tra la Camera di Commercio di Roma e il Consiglio del Debito Pubblico Ottomano sulla conversione delle obbligazioni privilegiate del 1890 [The dispute between the Chamber of Commerc," MPRA Paper 72670, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Juan Flores Zendejas & Pierre Pénet & Christian Suter, 2021. "The Revenge of Defaulters. Sovereign Defaults and Interstate Negotiations in the Post-War Financial Order, 1940–65," Post-Print hal-03352783, HAL.
    5. Marc Flandreau, 2013. "Sovereign states, bondholders committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the nineteenth century (1827–68): new facts and old fictions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 668-696, WINTER.
    6. Flores Zendejas, Juan, 2020. "Explaining Latin America's persistent defaults: an analysis of the debtor–creditor relations in London, 1822–1914," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 319-339, December.
    7. Haytham Y.M. Ewaida, 2016. "The European Crisis Without End: The Consequences of European Monetary Integration," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 6(8), pages 15-30, August.
    8. Haytham Y.M. Ewaida, 2016. "The European Crisis Without End: The Consequences of European Monetary Integration," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 6(8), pages 15-30, August.
    9. Bradley, Michael & De Lira Salvatierra, Irving & Gulati, Mitu, 2014. "Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the sovereign debt market?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(S), pages 150-168.

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