IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/erevae/v30y2003i3p305-332.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Allocating irrigation water: the impact of strategic interactions on the efficiency of rules

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Faysse

Abstract

In many irrigation schemes, farmers are autonomous in decision making regarding cropping patterns. Some allocation rules currently used in such schemes share water according to what farmers cultivate but then permit an interaction among farmers' choices, whose outcome may be described as a Nash equilibrium. Such rules are compared with other existing and potential rules, when farmers differ in their individual abilities to create value from water. A model simulating the Nash equilibrium associated with farmers' cropping choices reproduces the overcropping pattern observed in an irrigation scheme in Tunisia and makes possible the recommendation of better allocation rules. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Faysse, 2003. "Allocating irrigation water: the impact of strategic interactions on the efficiency of rules," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 30(3), pages 305-332, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:30:y:2003:i:3:p:305-332
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping With The Tragedy Of The Commons: Game Structure And Design Of Rules," Post-Print cirad-01002167, HAL.
    2. Salvador, R. & Latorre, B. & Paniagua, P. & Playán, E., 2011. "Farmers’ scheduling patterns in on-demand pressurized irrigation," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 86-96.
    3. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:30:y:2003:i:3:p:305-332. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eaaeeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.