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Intervention and peace

Author

Listed:
  • David K Levine
  • Salvatore Modica

Abstract

Intervention often does not lead to peace, but rather to prolonged conflict. Indeed, we document that it is an important source of prolonged conflicts. We introduce a theoretical model of the balance of power to explain why this should be the case and to analyse how peace can be achieved: either a hot peace between hostile neighbours or the peace of the strong dominating the weak. Non-intervention generally leads to peace after defeat of the weak. Hot peace can be achieved with sufficiently strong outside intervention. The latter is thus optimal if the goal of policy is to prevent the strong from dominating the weak.

Suggested Citation

  • David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Intervention and peace," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 33(95), pages 361-402.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:33:y:2018:i:95:p:361-402.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/epolic/eiy006
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Battiston & Matteo Bizzarri & Riccardo Franceschin, 2021. "Third-Party Interest, Resource Value, and the Likelihood of Conflict," CSEF Working Papers 631, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 20 Jun 2022.
    2. Giacomo Battiston & Matteo Bizzarri & Riccardo Franceschin, 2024. "Third parties and the non-monotonicity of the resource curse: Evidence from US military influence and oil value," CSEF Working Papers 701, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2022. "Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 394-421.
    4. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2020. "State Power and Conflict Driven Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000014, David K. Levine.
    5. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Marcos-Prieto, Pablo, 2024. "Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    6. David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli & Nicole Stoelinga, 2024. "Vote or Fight?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000199, David K. Levine.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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