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Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: a Framed Field Experiment

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  • Robert Stüber

Abstract

Why are high monetary payments prohibited for certain goods, thereby causing shortages in their supply? I conduct (i) a framed field experiment with a general population sample and (ii) a survey experiment with this sample and with ethics committees. In the experiment, participants can prohibit others from being offered money to register as stem-cell donors. I document that, whereas the majority of participants do not respond to changes in the incentives (63%) or become more in favour of the offer with higher incentives (20%), a minority of 17% prohibit high incentives. I show that this minority wants to protect individuals who are persuaded by high incentives. I also show that a lottery scheme reduces their objections to high incentives. Finally, I document that the public is much more supportive of high incentives than are ethics committees.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Stüber, 2024. "Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: a Framed Field Experiment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2580-2620.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:134:y:2024:i:662:p:2580-2620.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueae018
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