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Production, Appropriation, and Income Transfer

Author

Listed:
  • Suk Jae Noh

    (Dept. of Economics, Hallym University, 1 Okchon-dong, Chuncheon, Korea 200-702.)

Abstract

In a conflict between the prey and predator, the availability of income transfer option to the prey, given that defense is already an option, results in equilibrium where both defense and income transfer are utilized and the use of income transfer increases production efficiency by inducing either the prey or predator to divert resources from appropriation to production. The equilibrium amount of defense can be smaller because the prey has an interest in minimizing the amount of transfer that can be achieved in part by provoking a largest possible amount of offense from the predator if actual fight broke out. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Suk Jae Noh, 2002. "Production, Appropriation, and Income Transfer," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(2), pages 279-287, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:279-287
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    Cited by:

    1. MAYSTADT, Jean-François, 2007. "Does inequality make us rebel? A renewed theoretical model applied to South Mexico," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007081, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Jean-François Maystadt, 2008. "Does inequality make us rebel? A revisited theoretical model applied to South Mexico," HiCN Working Papers 41, Households in Conflict Network.
    3. Noh, Suk Jae, 2018. "More effective defense capabilities and pareto-improving resource transfers: Conflict on the Korean Peninsula," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-13.
    4. Dominic Rohner, 2010. "From rags to rifles: deprivation, conflict and the welfare state," IEW - Working Papers 463, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Noh, Suk Jae, 2002. "Resource distribution and stable alliances with endogenous sharing rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 129-151, March.
    6. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2021. "A Subscription vs. Appropriation Framework for Natural Resource Conflicts," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Anil Markandya & Dirk Rübbelke (ed.), CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT, chapter 9, pages 257-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Zuleta, Hernando & Villaveces, Marta Juanita & Andonova, Veneta, 2013. "Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-117.
    8. Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Conflict diamonds," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 267-286, March.
    9. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2020. "Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 891-927.

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