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An Evolutionary Explanation for Rotten Kids

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  • Linster, Bruce G

Abstract

The authors explore how natural selection acts upon genes for cooperation, altruism, and selfishness in an prisoner's dilemma played by family members. A key parameter determining behavior is that parents and children have different expectations of future offspring. Examining asexual and sexually reproducing populations, the authors show that which strategy of cooperation and defection proves be stable depends on the relative reproduction potential of the players and what proportion of the population is young. 'Rotten kids' with altruistic parents can be a stable outcome where reproductive success is the goal and natural selection may lead individuals to care about their unborn progeny. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Linster, Bruce G, 1998. "An Evolutionary Explanation for Rotten Kids," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 98-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:1:p:98-107
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    Cited by:

    1. D.J. Butler, 2000. "Accounting for Heterogeneous Choices in One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Games," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 00-22, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.

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