IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v33y1995i3p427-40.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto: A Predictive Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Grier, Kevin B
  • McDonald, Michael
  • Tollison, Robert D

Abstract

The authors argue that winner-take-all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested, larger states when making policy decisions. This hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states. In a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988, the authors find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Grier, Kevin B & McDonald, Michael & Tollison, Robert D, 1995. "Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto: A Predictive Theory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 427-440, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:33:y:1995:i:3:p:427-40
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zamir Eyal, 2020. "Refounding Law and Economics: Behavioral Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-35, July.
    2. Christopher M. Duquette & Franklin G . Mixon & Richard J. Cebula, 2017. "Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(1), pages 45-57, March.
    3. Robert K. Fleck, 1999. "Electoral Incentives, Public Policy, and the New Deal Realignment," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 377-404, January.
    4. Richard Cebula & Michael Toma, 2006. "Preliminary Evidence on the Allocation of U.S. Army Deaths from Operation Iraqi Freedom," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(1), pages 3-14, March.
    5. Bryan Caplan, 2001. "Has Leviathan Been Bound? A Theory of Imperfectly Constrained Government with Evidence from the States," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(4), pages 825-847, April.
    6. Alberto Batinti, 2016. "NIH biomedical funding: evidence of executive dominance in swing-voter states during presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 239-263, September.
    7. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2001. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(3), pages 598-617, January.
    8. Groseclose, Timothy J. & McCarty, Nolan, 1999. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," Research Papers 1617, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    9. Noel D. Campbell & R. Zachary Finney & David T. Mitchell, 2007. "Hunting the Whale: More Evidence on State Government Leviathans," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(2), pages 566-580, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:33:y:1995:i:3:p:427-40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.