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Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in Congressional Races

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  • Hersch, Philip L
  • McDougall, Gerald S

Abstract

Intimidate and overpower have been used in campaign lore to describe the effects of an incumbent's war chest on potential challengers. The authors argue that a war chest can deter challengers by signaling a credible commitment to mount a formidable campaign if entry occurs. Results from a trichotomous logit model indicate that a large war chest reduces both the probability of a contested race and the quality of the challenger where entry does occur. The effect on the efficiency of political markets is unclear, however, depending on the reasons why incumbents are able to raise large war chests. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Hersch, Philip L & McDougall, Gerald S, 1994. "Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in Congressional Races," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(4), pages 630-641, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:4:p:630-41
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    Cited by:

    1. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December.
    2. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-393, October.
    3. Milyo, Jeffrey & Groseclose, Timothy, 1999. "The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 699-722, October.
    4. Jay Goodliffe, 2005. "When Do War Chests Deter?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(2), pages 249-277, April.
    5. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-350, October.

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