IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v30y1992i4p696-713.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

What's Legal and What's Not: The Regulation of Opiates in 1912

Author

Listed:
  • Michaels, Robert J

Abstract

This paper develops a model to explain state-level opiate regulation in 1912. The personal choice of whether to engage in mainstream or deviant activity is determined by consumption technology and market prices, and voting determines the legality of deviant behavior. Voting outcomes depend on population characteristics including diversity, tolerance, visibility of deviance, and the distribution of consumption efficiencies. A logit equation whose dependent variable is the presence of a state opiate prescription law is estimated. Results broadly support the collective choice model and disconfirm the role of interest groups, particularly physicians, in determining prescription regulation. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaels, Robert J, 1992. "What's Legal and What's Not: The Regulation of Opiates in 1912," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 696-713, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:4:p:696-713
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Bijou & Lester, David, 1995. "New directions for economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 433-446.
    2. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:4:p:696-713. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.