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The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-dumping Laws

Author

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  • Webb, Michael

Abstract

The antidumping law is most often applied in oligopolistic industries, while most analyses focus on the monopoly model. The author analyzes a duopoly model where a foreign firm engages in price-based dumping. Under Cournot behavior, the antidumping law has ambiguous price and welfare effects. When the home firm is a Stackleberg leader, two disquieting effects emerge. First, the home firm can use the antidumping law to curtail competition even when the foreign firm does not initially engage in dumping. Second, the antidumping law can increase profits of both firms at the expense of domestic consumers. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Webb, Michael, 1992. "The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-dumping Laws," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 437-448, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:3:p:437-48
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    Cited by:

    1. David R. Collie & Vo Phuong Mai Le, 2010. "Antidumping Regulations: Anti‐Competitive and Anti‐Export," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 796-806, November.
    2. Jan Haaland & Ian Wooton, 1998. "Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 134(2), pages 340-362, June.
    3. Chung-Fu Lai & Xi-Tsz Lee, 2016. "The Effects of Antidumping Duties in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics Model," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(3), pages 837-844.
    4. Falvey, Rod & Wittayarungruangsri, Sarut, 2006. "Market size and antidumping in duopolistic competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 771-786, September.
    5. Chung-Fu Lai, 2016. "Anti-Dumping Duties and Macroeconomic Dynamics in a Floating Exchange Rate Regime," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 7(1), pages 21-34, June.
    6. Chung-Fu Lai, 2016. "The Effects of Anti-Dumping Duties in a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime," Applied Economics and Finance, Redfame publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 25-36, August.

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