IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v26y1988i1p159-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pressure Groups and Public Expenditures: The Flypaper Effect Reconsidered

Author

Listed:
  • Dougan, William R
  • Kenyon, Daphne A

Abstract

A model of government budgeting is developed in which lobbying by interest group s can divert the allocation of funds away from the one preferred by t he median voter. The model is applied to state and local governments to show that the "flypaper effect"-the tendency for lump-sum grants to increase public expenditures by more than an equivalent increase in the community's pretax income-can be explained without the customa ry assumption of voter fiscal illusion. Furthermore, the model predic ts variation in the extent of the flypaper effect among expenditure c ategories, as found in previous empirical studies. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dougan, William R & Kenyon, Daphne A, 1988. "Pressure Groups and Public Expenditures: The Flypaper Effect Reconsidered," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 159-170, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:26:y:1988:i:1:p:159-70
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Burton Abrams & William Dougan, 1986. "The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 101-116, January.
    2. Yihua Yu & Jing Wang & Xi Tian, 2016. "Identifying the Flypaper Effect in the Presence of Spatial Dependence: Evidence from Education in China's Counties," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 93-110, March.
    3. Andrew Abbott & Philip Jones, 2016. "Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: State Government Expenditure in the United States," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 177-193, May.
    4. Juan González Alegre, 2012. "An evaluation of EU regional policy. Do structural actions crowd out public spending?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 1-21, April.
    5. Eric Brunner & Joshua Hyman & Andrew Ju, 2020. "School Finance Reforms, Teachers' Unions, and the Allocation of School Resources," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 473-489, July.
    6. Abbott, Andrew & Jones, Philip, 2012. "Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 447-451.
    7. Roberto Dell'Anno & Vincenzo Maria De Rosa, 2013. "The Relevance of the Theory of Fiscal Illusion. The Case of the Italian Tax System," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2013(2), pages 63-92.
    8. Singhal, Monica, 2008. "Special interest groups and the allocation of public funds," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 548-564, April.
    9. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2013. "Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201320, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    10. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    11. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2012. "Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201212, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    12. Ross, Justin M. & Yan, Wenli, 2013. "Fiscal Illusion From Property Reassessment? An Empirical Test of the Residual View," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(1), pages 7-32, March.
    13. Abbott, Andrew & Cabral, René & Jones, Philip & Palacios, Roberto, 2015. "Political pressure and procyclical expenditure: An analysis of the expenditures of state governments in Mexico," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 195-206.
    14. José Cruz, 2001. "An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities," ERSA conference papers ersa01p25, European Regional Science Association.
    15. Muhammed Islam, 1998. "Fiscal Illusion, Intergovernmental Grants and Local Spending," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(1), pages 63-71.
    16. Strumpf, Koleman S., 1998. "A predictive index for the flypaper effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 389-412, September.
    17. Paula S. Kearns, 1994. "State budget periodicity: An analysis of the determinants and the effect on state spending," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(2), pages 331-362.
    18. Rui Nuno Baleiras, 2001. "To fragment or to consolidate jurisdictions: the optimal architecture of government," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp401, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    19. Pablo Acosta, 2010. "The “flypaper effect” in presence of spatial interdependence: evidence from Argentinean municipalities," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 44(3), pages 453-466, June.
    20. Pirade, Ramadhan & Jamali, Hisnol, 2018. "Evaluating Financial Performance In Local Government: A Study In South Sulawesi Province (Indonesia)," OSF Preprints rh9xw, Center for Open Science.
    21. Andrew Abbott & Philip Jones, 2013. "Procyclical government spending: a public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 243-258, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:26:y:1988:i:1:p:159-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.