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Rules Versus Human Beings, and the Mandate of the ECB

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  • Marcel Fratzscher

Abstract

The actions by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the global and European crises have triggered a highly controversial debate, in particular in Germany, about the costs and benefits of the chosen policy path. The article reviews, compares, and evaluates the different arguments made in favor and against ECB policies around three key dimensions—the link of the policy path to price stability, financial stability, and economic policy. It argues that this debate is not only about the weighing of the benefits against the costs of monetary policy, but it is primarily about the question which mandate the ECB should pursue. This question remains unanswered.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Fratzscher, 2016. "Rules Versus Human Beings, and the Mandate of the ECB," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(1), pages 68-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:62:y:2016:i:1:p:68-87.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifv018
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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