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The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making -super-1

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  • Mika Widgrén

Abstract

This article deals with the design of voting rules in the European Union (EU) Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are examined. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the Member States, and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is that voting rules matter. This clearly explains why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations. The internal decision-making rules in the Council have substantial impact on both the national distribution of power in the Council and inter-institutional power between the EU's; decision-making bodies. (JEL codes: C70, D71, D71, H77). Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Mika Widgrén, 2009. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making -super-1," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 55(1), pages 30-56, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:55:y:2009:i:1:p:30-56
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifn039
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Becker, Sascha O. & Egger, Peter H. & von Ehrlich, Maximilian, 2010. "Going NUTS: The effect of EU Structural Funds on regional performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 578-590, October.
    2. Nikolaos Antonakakis & Harald Badinger & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2014. "From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp175, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    3. Jorge Núñez Ferrer & Jacques Le Cacheux & Giacomo Benedetto & Mathieu Saunier & Fabien Candau & Claude Emonnot & Florence Lachet-Touya & Jorgen Mortensen & Aymeric Potteau & Igor Taranic, 2016. "Study on the potential and limitations of reforming the financing of the EU budget [Perspectives et limites pour réformer le financement du budget de l’UE]," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01848029, HAL.
    4. Jenny Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2014. "Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 29-46, August.
    5. Becker, Sascha O. & Egger, Peter H. & von Ehrlich, Maximilian, 2012. "Too much of a good thing? On the growth effects of the EU's regional policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 648-668.
    6. Meyer, Eric, 2013. "Die Macht der Mitgliedstaaten im Ministerrat der EU und im Ministerrat für Fragen der Währungsunion nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 36, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).
    7. Jorge Núñez Ferrer & Jacques Le Cacheux & Giacomo Benedetto & Mathieu Saunier & Fabien Candau & Claude Emonnot & Florence Lachet-Touya & Jorgen Mortensen & Aymeric Potteau & Igor Taranic, 2016. "Study on the potential and limitations of reforming the financing of the EU budget
      [Perspectives et limites pour réformer le financement du budget de l’UE]      ," Working Papers hal-01848029, HAL.
    8. Badinger, Harald & Mühlböck, Monika & Nindl, Elisabeth & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2014. "Theoretical vs. empirical power indices: Do preferences matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 158-176.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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