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The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums

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  • Mahoney, Paul G
  • Weinstein, Mark

Abstract

The appraisal remedy affords corporate shareholders the option to redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain transactions, including mergers. Access to appraisal for publicly traded shares, however, differs from state to state. We present the first large-sample empirical study of the effect of appraisal rights on target shareholder gains from acquisitions. We examine 1,350 mergers involving publicly held firms. We find some evidence that appraisal reduces average shareholder gains in transactions involving self-interested managers. For the entire sample, however, we find no evidence that appraisal has any effect, positive or negative, on target shareholder gains from takeovers. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Mahoney, Paul G & Weinstein, Mark, 1999. "The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 1(1-2), pages 239-275, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:1:y:1999:i:1-2:p:239-75
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    Cited by:

    1. Feng Chen & Kenton K. Yee & Yong Keun Yoo, 2010. "Robustness of Judicial Decisions to Valuation‐Method Innovation: An Exploratory Empirical Study," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9‐10), pages 1094-1114, November.
    2. Panunzi, Fausto & Mueller, Holger, 2003. "Tender Offers and Leverage," CEPR Discussion Papers 3964, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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