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Government Preferences and Public Forest Harvesting: A Second-Best Approach

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  • Gregory S. Amacher

Abstract

Around the world governments own forest capital stocks and can harvest them for revenue or provide public goods from preserving them. This article examines how government preferences for revenue generation and public goods provision affect policy choices. Many instances are found where governments might exploit public forests at the expense of public goods. This is most likely when budget pressures are severe, or when the government prefers revenue generation to nontimber benefits provision. In particular, budget-constrained governments are more likely to exploit public harvests to raise revenues and subsidize the forest sector, especially when revenues are increasing in public harvesting. Public harvesting should also influence tax choice. The results shed light on current forest policy debates and can be used to predict behavior of developed and developing country governments facing external pressures. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory S. Amacher, 1999. "Government Preferences and Public Forest Harvesting: A Second-Best Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(1), pages 14-28.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:81:y:1999:i:1:p:14-28
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1244447
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hansen, Christian P. & Lund, Jens F., 2011. "The political economy of timber taxation: The case of Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(8), pages 630-641, October.
    2. Coordes, Renke, 2016. "Coordination of forest management through market and political institutions," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 66-77.
    3. Daigneault, Adam J. & Sohngen, Brent L. & Sedjo, Roger, 2020. "Carbon and market effects of U.S. forest taxation policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    4. Gregory S. Amacher & Erkki Koskela & Markku Ollikainen, 2004. "Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1131, CESifo.
    5. Gong, Peichen & Susaeta, Andres, 2020. "Impacts of forest tax under timber price uncertainty," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    6. Newman, D.H., 2002. "Forestry's golden rule and the development of the optimal forest rotation literature," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 5-27.
    7. Amacher, Gregory S. & Ollikainen, Markku & Koskela, Erkki, 2012. "Corruption and forest concessions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 92-104.

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