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Domestic Costs of Statutory Marketing Authorities: The Case of the Canadian Wheat Board

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  • Colin A. Carter
  • R.M.A. Loyns
  • Derek Berwald

Abstract

The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a statutory marketing authority with exclusive control over exports of Canadian wheat and barley and sole authority over domestic marketing of milling wheat and malting barley. It is a government marketing board with implicit monopoly rights over the supply of wide-ranging marketing services to farmers, but with no legal responsibility to farmers. These characteristics fit a stylized Niskanen model of bureaucratic decision making, where the CWB is modeled as supplying excess marketing services to farmers. Allowing the market to determine the quantity of marketing services would result in lower marketing costs and presumably higher farm incomes. Copyright 1998, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Colin A. Carter & R.M.A. Loyns & Derek Berwald, 1998. "Domestic Costs of Statutory Marketing Authorities: The Case of the Canadian Wheat Board," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(2), pages 313-324.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:80:y:1998:i:2:p:313-324
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