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Competition Versus Collusion: The Parallel Behaviour In The Absence Of The Symetry Assumption

Author

Listed:
  • Mosteanu Tatiana

    (Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Insurance, Banking and Stock Exchanges)

  • Dragoi Ionut

    (Romanian Competition Council, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Insurance, Banking and Stock Exchanges)

  • Romano Oana Maria

    (Misys Banking Systems, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Insurance, Banking and Stock Exchanges)

Abstract

Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of competition authorities. A special case of cartel is the parallel behaviour in terms of price selling. This type of behaviour is difficult to assess and its analysis has not always conclusive results. For evaluating such behaviour the data available are compared with theoretical values obtained by using a competitive or a collusive model. When different competitive or collusive models are considered, for the simplicity of calculations the economists use the symmetry assumption of costs and quantities produced / sold. This assumption has the disadvantage that the theoretical values obtained may deviate significantly from actual values (the real values on the market), which can sometimes lead to ambiguous results. The present paper analyses the parallel behaviour of economic agents in the absence of the symmetry assumption and study the identification of the model in this conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Mosteanu Tatiana & Dragoi Ionut & Romano Oana Maria, 2012. "Competition Versus Collusion: The Parallel Behaviour In The Absence Of The Symetry Assumption," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 690-694, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2012:i:1:p:690-694
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    parallel behaviour; Cournot competition; collusion; identification symmetry hipothesis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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