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Managementul omnipotent şi puterea stimulentelor etatiste. Hazard moral în interiorul corporaţiei moderne

Author

Listed:
  • Iacob Mihaela, Jora Octavian-Dragomir

    (Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti)

Abstract

The logic of agency problems is that “legally” the principals are (institutionally) hampered from configuring or securing the contractual precautions they wish to enforce out of those available in a pure free market. We review topics pointing that omnipotent management phenomenon is not a so-called “asymmetric information” market failure, but a State failure in protecting private property.

Suggested Citation

  • Iacob Mihaela, Jora Octavian-Dragomir, 2012. "Managementul omnipotent şi puterea stimulentelor etatiste. Hazard moral în interiorul corporaţiei moderne," Revista OEconomica, Romanian Society for Economic Science, Revista OEconomica, issue 01, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oen:econom:y:2012:i:01:id:320
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    Cited by:

    1. Cristian DÎRVĂ & Anda Simona DÎRVĂ, 2019. "“Managing Risks” versus “Taking Risks”: Revisiting an Underestimated Distinction between Managers and Entrepreneurs," Eastern European Journal for Regional Studies (EEJRS), Center for Studies in European Integration (CSEI), Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova (ASEM), vol. 5(1), pages 112-124, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    business corporation; private property; contract; state interventionism; law of unintended consequences; moral hazard; principal-agent problems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General

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