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Monetary policy decision-making and accountability structures: some cross-country comparisons

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Abstract

Monetary policy decisions are typically made by independent central banks. But the details of the monetary policy decision-making and accountability structures differ widely across countries. This article outlines the key features of monetary policy governance and accountability arrangements of a range of advanced and emerging countries with similar approaches to monetary policy to that used in New Zealand.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Aldridge & Amy Wood, 2014. "Monetary policy decision-making and accountability structures: some cross-country comparisons," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 77, pages 15-30, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:nzb:nzbbul:mar2014:02
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    File URL: http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Bulletins/2014/2014mar77-1aldridgewood.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniela Wech, 2015. "Central Banks: Functions, Decision-making and Accountability," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(03), pages 68-71, October.
    2. Daniela Wech, 2015. "Central Banks: Functions, Decision-making and Accountability," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(3), pages 68-71, October.
    3. Daniela Wech, 2015. "Ein Überblick über Funktionen, Entscheidungsstrukturen und Rechenschaftspflichten von Zentralbanken," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 68(22), pages 48-51, November.
    4. Ashley Dunstan, 2014. "The interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policy," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 77, pages 15-25, June.
    5. repec:ces:ifodic:v:13:y:2015:i:3:p:19172609 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Chris Hunt, 2017. "Independence with accountability: financial system regulation and the Reserve Bank," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 80, December.

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