IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nwe/eajour/y2024i4p722-739.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Antitrust Regulation Harms Consumers

Author

Listed:
  • Georgi Kiranchev

    (University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria)

Abstract

This article examines the effects of antitrust regulation. It is always assumed that this regulation has the purpose and function of protecting the interests of consumers. The other function of regulation is to protect competition, and it is assumed that this also indirectly protects consumer interests, because the dogma ‚the more competition the better‘ is accepted without reservation. We will demonstrate that antitrust regulation can harm consumer interests and will consistently prove the following theses in general: Antitrust regulation leads to a new, forced market equilibrium from which no participant has an interest in deviating. Regulation results in an equilibrium that is less profitable for consumers but more profitable for players that are not subject to antitrust regulation. In maximising their profit, players will offer quantities to the market such that the price on the market will increase and the total quantity offered will decrease. The efficiency of production decreases as a result of regulation. Although anti-monopoly regulation leads to a redistribution of market shares and profits, it generally leads to an increase in the equilibrium price for consumers and thus harms their interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgi Kiranchev, 2024. "The Antitrust Regulation Harms Consumers," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 4, pages 722-739, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2024:i:4:p:722-739
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.unwe.bg/doi/eajournal/2024.4/EA.2024.4.02.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumer protection; Nash Equilibrium; antitrust regulation; protection of competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2024:i:4:p:722-739. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Vanya Lazarova (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/unweebg.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.