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Deterring Property Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental Evaluation of Nudge Strategies

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  • Michael Chirico
  • Robert Inman
  • Charles Loeffler
  • John MacDonald
  • Holger Sieg

Abstract

Municipal governments commonly confront the problem of tardy or delinquent property tax payments. We implement an experiment in property tax collection for tardy taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia for the calendar year 2015. The experiment sent one of seven reminder letters to the tardy taxpayers, testing the efficacy of a simple reminder; two alternative reminders stressing economic sanctions; and four alternative reminders emphasizing either that taxpayers receive neighborhood services or city-wide services for their tax payments, that most of their neighbors pay their taxes on time, or that as a citizen in a democracy it is a civic duty to pay taxes on time. Compliance behaviors were compared to a holdout sample that received no reminder letter. The most effective letters were those that threatened an economic sanction for continued non-compliance. These letters were particularly cost-effective in raising additional city revenues. There was no evidence that those receiving a reminder for calendar year 2015 improved their tax compliance behavior in calendar year 2016.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Chirico & Robert Inman & Charles Loeffler & John MacDonald & Holger Sieg, 2019. "Deterring Property Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental Evaluation of Nudge Strategies," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 72(3), pages 479-506, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:72:y:2019:i:3:p:479-506
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2019.3.01
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh & Dai, Zhixin & Wang, Kezhi, 2021. "Does the frequency of reminders matter for their effectiveness? A randomized controlled trial," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 752-764.
    2. Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Yogama, Eko Arief & Gray, Daniel J. & Rablen, Matthew D., 2024. "Nudging for prompt tax penalty payment: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 548-579.
    4. Castro, Juan Francisco & Velásquez, Daniel & Beltrán, Arlette & Yamada, Gustavo, 2020. "Spillovers and Long-Run Effects of Messages on Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence from Peru," IZA Discussion Papers 13974, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Monica Mogollon & Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2021. "Who’s calling? The effect of phone calls and personal interaction on tax compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(6), pages 1302-1328, December.
    6. C. Yiwei Zhang & Jeffrey Hemmeter & Judd B. Kessler & Robert D. Metcalfe & Robert Weathers, 2023. "Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the U.S. Supplemental Security Income Program," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 1341-1353, March.
    7. Ortega, Daniel & Scartascini, Carlos, 2020. "Don’t blame the messenger. The Delivery method of a message matters," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 286-300.
    8. Castro, Juan Francisco & Velásquez, Daniel & Beltrán, Arlette & Yamada, Gustavo, 2022. "The direct and indirect effects of messages on tax compliance: Experimental evidence from Peru," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 483-518.
    9. Casal, Sandro & Faillo, Marco & Mittone, Luigi, 2022. "I want to pay! - Identifying the Unconditional Tax Propensity (UTP)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 103-114.
    10. Schächtele, Simeon & Eguino, Huáscar & Roman, Soraya, 2022. "Improving taxpayer registration through nudging? Field experimental evidence from Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

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