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Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis

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  • Edmiston, Kelly D.

Abstract

Using an eight-region, eight-sector applied general equilibrium model, we find that when imposed independently, single-factor sales policies may have substantially positive economic development impacts in the very long run, but that the magnitude of these effects varies considerably across regions according to their individual characteristics. If all regions act simultaneously, however, there are very clear winners and losers, and the competitive economic development landscape is markedly reshaped. In essence, the apportionment game is a prisoner’s dilemma: regardless of the strategies of other states, each state’s best economic development strategy is single factor sales. Moreover, we find that the revenue consequences of strategic apportionment policies, which have been under appreciated in both the literature and in state legislatures, are much more substantial in magnitude than are the economic development impacts, and tend to be felt immediately, while economic development benefits are much longer term in nature.

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  • Edmiston, Kelly D., 2002. "Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 55(2), pages 239-262, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:55:y:2002:i:2:p:239-262
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2002.2.03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anand, Bharat N. & Sansing, Richard, 2000. "The Weighting Game: Formula Apportionment as an Instrument of Public Policy," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 53(n. 2), pages 183-200, June.
    2. Anand, Bharat N. & Sansing, Richard, 2000. "The Weighting Game: Formula Apportionment as an Instrument of Public Policy," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 53(2), pages 183-200, June.
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    1. Martini, Jan-Thomas & Niemann, Rainer & Simons, Dirk, 2014. "Management incentives under formula apportionment: Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 168, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    2. Ruud De Mooij & Li Liu & Dinar Prihardini, 2021. "An Assessment of Global Formula Apportionment," National Tax Journal, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(2), pages 431-465.
    3. Ortmann, Regina, 2015. "Uncertainty in weighting formulary apportionment factors and its impact on after-tax income of multinational groups," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 184, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    4. Hines Jr., James R., 2010. "Income misattribution under formula apportionment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 108-120, January.
    5. Jeffrey Condon & Andrew Feltenstein & Florenz Plassman & Mark Rider & David L. Sjoquist, 2014. "A Regional Model of Growth Oriented Fiscal Policy: An Application to Georgia and Its Competitor States," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 44(2), pages 177-209, Summer.
    6. Stephen J. Lusch & James Stekelberg, 2020. "State Tax Haven Legislation and Corporate Income Tax Revenues," Public Finance Review, , vol. 48(3), pages 354-383, May.
    7. Sommer, Christoph, 2008. "Theorie der Besteuerung nach Formula Apportionment − Untersuchung auftretender ökonomischer Effekte anhand eines Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 46, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    8. Robert F. Conrad, 2006. "Interjurisdictional Taxation and Attribution Rules," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(5), pages 505-526, September.
    9. Johannes Becker, 2024. "Rationalizing Formula Apportionment," CESifo Working Paper Series 11234, CESifo.
    10. Jan Thomas Martini & Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2014. "Management Incentives under Formula Apportionment - Tax-Induced Distortions of Effort and Compensation in a Principal-Agent Setting -," CESifo Working Paper Series 4908, CESifo.

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