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Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist

Author

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  • Wang, Leonard F.S.
  • Conant, John L.

Abstract

Formulates a model for monopolists which incorporates incentives to reduce tax liability by under-reporting profits through overstatement of production costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Leonard F.S. & Conant, John L., 1988. "Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 41(4), pages 579-581, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:41:y:1988:i:4:p:579-81
    DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41788762
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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